

10 Jan 69

Messrs. Hyland, Moor and Blaufarb

GACarver, Jr.

Attached is the note I gave the Director on 10 January reflecting, I hope, the consensus judgments of our conversation yesterday.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

GAC/mee

1@ - Addressees w/att

1 -

1 - GAC Chrono ✓

1 - Paris Negotiations file

1 - Memos TO and FROM DCI file

25X1

SECRET

10 January 1969

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: "Views of the DCI as to the Effectiveness of the Counter-Infrastructure Program in Vietnam in Inducing Hanoi to Engage in Substantive Discussions in Paris"

1. Hanoi's response to President Johnson's 31 March suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam and call for negotiations, Hanoi's dispatch of its negotiators to Paris in May, and these negotiators' behavior since then were dictated, collectively, by an amalgam of strategic considerations and estimates. It is not possible in Washington -- nor, probably, would it be possible even in Hanoi -- to gauge the precise influence or impact on these basic strategic decisions of any single element of the total situation or any single allied program.

2. Similarly, the relative hardness or flexibility of Hanoi's future approach to major substantive issues discussed in Paris, the manner in which Hanoi's negotiators are willing to discuss them and -- particularly -- the concessions Hanoi is willing to make or entertain will be determined by the North Vietnamese leadership's overall net assessment of many factors, including its estimate of the situation on the ground in Vietnam and of the political climate in the United States and its estimate of whether the passage of time (measured in weeks or months) is likely to improve the Vietnamese Communists' position, make it worse, or leave it essentially unchanged. No single factor, no single allied program will of itself be decisive. Nonetheless, the integrity, strength and capability of their politico-military control apparatus in the South is a matter Hanoi's leaders consider vital to the achievement of their overall objective of acquiring political domination over South Vietnam. Thus Hanoi would have to view with grave concern any indications that this control structure was eroding or any allied program that Hanoi felt posed a fundamental threat to this structure.

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